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Democracy is widely recognised as important for redistribution, and cultural 
diversity is often considered inimical to democracy (although astute institutional 
design might be able to deal with the problem).  Does cultural diversity affect 
redistribution, not simply through impeding democracy but also perhaps through 
defining acceptable limits of social or economic solidarity?  This paper compares 
three ‘new democracies’: South Africa, Brazil and Nigeria.  The South African 
case suggests that cultural diversity can co-exist with an exceptional level of 
redistribution from rich to poor.  If there is a substantial overlap between class 
and cultural group (race, in the South African case) then cultural diversity might 
strengthen feelings of defensive cross-class and cross-group solidarity among the 
rich, making a redistributive compromise more likely than in a more culturally 
homogeneous setting.  Brazil illustrates this latter possibility: less cultural 
heterogeneity accompanied by less solidarity and less redistribution.  Elites (and 
non-elite vested interests) are unwilling and the poor are unable (i.e. lack the 
power) to secure a redistributive compromise.  Brazilian society is not culturally 
homogeneous, but the politicisation of its cultural differences and the weakness of 
egalitarian solidarities are the products rather than the cause of Brazil’s 
institutional design. Nigeria is a case where cultural diversity might appear to 
underpin the powerlessness of the poor and the limited reach of democracy.  But a 
closer inspection suggests that institutional design and the political economy of oil 
might have more of an effect than cultural diversity per se.  The conclusions are 
that any effects that cultural diversity might have on egalitarian policies are 
highly conditional on a range of other factors, and that federal institutional design 
is a crucial factor undermining redistributive politics and policies. 
 
 
1. Solidarity and Social Citizenship in the North 
 
What determines the extent to which citizenship has a ‘social’ or ‘economic’ 
dimension?  How important is it for a country’s citizens to have some sense of 
social or economic solidarity with their fellow citizens?  What produces such 





and hence also impede the private practices or public policies that redistribute 
resources and secure social citizenship?  To answer these questions adequately 
would require detailed data on redistribution, both public and private; on attitudes 
and prejudices; and on the political mechanisms that link these.  The full range of 
such data is not even available for the countries of the North (i.e. North America, 
Europe, Japan and Australasia), let alone those of the South (in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Africa and the rest of Asia). 
 
We do have data for the advanced capitalist democracies of the North showing 
that the state serves as a mechanism for substantial redistribution from rich to 
poor.  Cross-national comparisons are difficult because of the generally poor 
comparability of data, but a series of studies indicates the broad patterns.  Korpi 
and Palme (1998), using data on direct taxes and cash transfers from the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), estimate that the Gini coefficient for disposable 
income is between one quarter and one half lower than the Gini coefficient for 
market incomes (i.e. net of direct taxes and cash transfers).  Redistribution was 
smallest in the USA and Switzerland, and greatest in Sweden.  Przeworski and 
Gandhi (1999), using data from the much-criticised Deininger and Squire dataset, 
found that the bottom quintile’s share of total income rose by between 1.4 and 5 
percentage points in a sample of seventeen countries (with ‘corrective 
redistribution’ greatest in Israel and lowest in Switzerland).  Milanovic (1999), 
also using LIS data, broadly confirmed Korpi and Palme’s findings.  In twenty-
four democracies, government transfers and direct taxes reduce income inequality 
by an average of 14 percentage points, as measured by the Gini coefficient.  But 
he found that the bottom two deciles benefited much more than Przeworski and 
Gandhi had found – by, together, about 10 percentage points on average.  
Country-specific data goes further, analysing the incidence of indirect taxes and 
even government spending.  Data for Britain suggests that the Gini coefficient 
falls from 0.53 to 0.38 for post-tax income (i.e. taking into account indirect taxes) 
(Harris, 1999).  I estimate that taking into account benefits-in-kind (public 
education, health care, and so on) reduces the Gini by another 8 percentage points 
in the U.K., so that the combined effect of taxes, cash benefits and benefits-in-
kind reduces the Gini by almost one half.  These various studies might disagree on 
the precise extent of redistribution, but the general picture is clear: inequalities are 
reduced substantially. 
 
In a very real sense, then, these states do recognise a range of social or economic 
rights, i.e. the social dimension of citizenship.  ‘By the social element’, Marshall 
wrote so eloquently in 1949, ‘I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum 
of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social 





prevailing in the society’ (Marshall, 1949/1992: 8).  The equality of citizenship 
served to mitigate the inequalities of class.  If economic ‘solidarity’ is understood 
as an outcome, akin to the social (and economic) dimension of citizenship, then 
solidarity appears to be strong in most of these Northern welfare states. 
 
There is an extensive literature on the origins of these redistributive welfare states.  
Some explanations focus on the class compromise between the industrial 
working-class and the bourgeoisie: empowered as citizens but falling short of a 
majority of the electorate, the working-class concedes capitalist organisation of 
production in return for redistribution through the budget (Korpi, 1983; 
Przeworski, 1985; and implicitly, Marshall, 1949).  Others explanations 
emphasise the importance of broader coalitions: between workers and small 
farmers (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Luebbert, 1991), between workers and the 
middle-classes (Baldwin, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998), and even including 
sometimes capital itself (Swenson, 1999).  As Esping-Andersen (1990) showed, 
different political alignments led to distinctive forms (or ‘worlds’) of welfare 
capitalism (see also Baldwin, 1990; Huber et al., 1993).  The establishment of 
welfare programmes creates new constituencies of beneficiaries, as became 
evident when conservative parties sought to dismantle the welfare state (Pierson, 
1995). 
 
Each of these explanations implies two kinds of attitudes that might usefully be 
thought of in terms of economic ‘solidarity’.  On the one hand, there is a strong 
intra-group solidarity among prospective beneficiaries.  On the other hand, elites 
have a weak (or reluctant) inter-group solidarity in that they are willing, under 
actual or threatened pressure, to agree to a compromise on social citizenship in 
return for a compromise on inequality-generating markets.  (Given that the 
impetus comes from fear, ‘solidarity’ is perhaps a curious word to describe this; 
whatever the cause, however, the outcome is clearly a form of economic 
solidarity).  Spreading benefits broadly means that strong solidarity is maximised 
and weak solidarity in turn becomes more likely.  As Baldwin (1990) emphasises, 
orientating welfare toward the management of risk can generate a broader 
coalition than emphasising redistribution from rich to poor.  And, as Korpi and 
Palme (1998) argue, universal welfare programmes might be more redistributive 
than targeted ones and social insurance more redistributive than social assistance 
if they allow the middle-class to buy into bigger spending programmes.   
 
The overall map of redistribution in most Northern societies has reflected the 
contours of socio-economic class.  Poorer and some middle-classes have typically 
combined to pool risks in such a way that the middle-class is protected against ill 





Solidarity has its limits: some individuals are typically considered to be 
‘undeserving poor’ – i.e. undeserving of public support – on grounds of behaviour 
(including an unwillingness to perform the ‘obligations’ of citizenship) or non-
citizenship (i.e. being citizens of some other state).  And there is always dispute 
over who should pay and how.  But solidarities were generally not fragmented by 
sub-national ethnic or religious differences. Only relatively recently has it been 
argued that growing cultural diversity in these Northern societies, and especially a 
growing emphasis on ‘multi-cultural’ policies, is eroding the kinds of solidarities 
that sustained redistribution. White working-class Canadians might be unwilling 
to see non-white working-class Canadians (perhaps immigrants) benefiting from 
public largesse, whilst richer tax-paying Canadians might be unwilling to see their 
taxes redistributed to non-white Canadians.1 
 
 
2. Solidarity and Social Citizenship in the South 
 
We might expect that cultural diversity is a much stronger impediment to 
economic solidarity and redistribution in the countries of the South. There is, 
unsurprisingly, much less data on redistribution for countries in the South than 
there is in those of the North.  Data on the incidence of taxation and public 
spending in the South is patchy, uneven and rarely comparable.  Lecaillon et al. 
(1984) summarise a set of studies conducted between 1963 and 1973 (in Hong 
Kong, India, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Chile, Columbia, Panama, Puerto Rico 
and Iran) and there are more recent studies of Chile (Foxley, 1979; Mujica and 
Larrañaga, 1993; Engel et al, 1998), Columbia (Selowsky, 1979) and Malaysia 
(Meerman, 1979), the Philippines (Devarjan and Hossain, 1995), Peru (Escobal et 
al., 1993), Venezuela (Márquez et al., 1993), the Dominican Republic (Santana 
and Rathe, 1993), and Brazil and South Africa (see below).  Foxley (1979) and, 
more recently, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB, 1999) have collated 
evidence on Latin America.  In general, as in the North, taxation is not in itself a 
mechanism for reducing inequality (which means that studies of expenditure 
incidence are valuable even without studies of tax incidence).  Rather, it is the 
incidence and level of public expenditure that is important (the latter being 
affected by the level of taxation).  Because expenditure is so often captured by 
non-poor groups, Gini coefficients are not reduced by anywhere near as much as 
in the industrialised democracies of the North.  Even taking into account social 
spending (especially education and health), almost all studies suggest that Gini 
                                                          
1  In their contributions to Van Parijs’ forthcoming edited collection, Banting and Kymlicka 
examine some evidence on the relationship between multi-culturalism and redistribution (van 
Parijs, P. (ed.), Cultural Diversity versus Economic Solidarity, Brussels: Deboeck Universite, 





coefficients are reduced by between 0 and 7 percentage points; the only exception 
– which we shall examine further below – is South Africa. 
 
In the South, social citizenship might entail a greater emphasis on policies and 
activities that are hard to measure, such as land reform, exchange-rate policy and 
price-setting for agricultural produce, as well as labour market and other policies 
affecting the growth path.  Evidence tends to suggest much the same pattern as for 
tax, cash transfers and social policies: few benefits accrue to the poor.   
 
There are two prominent explanations for the general lack of redistribution in the 
South.  The first explanation refers to the powerlessness of the poor relative to 
elites.  In crude political economy accounts, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Bank and international capital, and their local collaborators,  ride 
roughshod over ‘the people’. This argument underestimates the importance of 
politics, especially once democratisation has resulted in citizenship having at least 
some political content.  The argument assumes that the power of capital is so 
overwhelming that citizenship is rendered meaningless or inconsequential.  How 
or why this occurs is never explained.   
 
The second explanation takes citizens more seriously and is more germane in a 
supposedly democratic context.  It focuses on culture, and especially cultural (i.e. 
racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic) divisions that divide the poor. Solidarity 
occurs along vertical rather than horizontal lines: within the family, community or 
group.  Loyalties lie with cultural leaders (who are probably also economic 
patrons), not with peers.  In the extreme case of ‘divided societies’, there appears 
to be strong solidarity within cultural groups but none between them. The winners 
tend to be the elites within each group and in practice, social rights are rarely 
enjoyed even within the group.  This argument assumes that cultural boundaries 
are so impervious that the ‘median voter’ is meaningless or inconsequential.  If 
citizens can only act in political blocks based on cultural groups, then the 
mechanisms of representative democracy render governments accountable at best 
to cultural groups en bloc, meaning – in practice – the dominant elites within each 
group, or at worst to the dominant elites in the dominant cultural group(s).   
 
Figure 1 juxtaposes the political model implicit in the ‘divided society’ argument 
against the ideal type model of Northern welfare states.  We might expect that 
societies would line up somewhere between these two ideal types.  As attitudes 
and solidarities become more class-based, then a redistributive class compromise 







Figure 1: Ideal types of solidarity and redistribution 
 















Collating comparable data for Southern countries is not easy.  Data on each of 
‘cultural diversity’, solidarities and political cleavages (i.e. the first three boxes in 
Figure 1) is more available than data on redistribution (i.e. the final box).  One 
measure of cultural diversity is the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, 
originally calculated by Soviet researchers and reported by Mauro (1995).  The 
index measures the probability that two randomly-selected members of the 
population do not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group.  Countries such as 
India, Indonesia and Canada have high scores; countries like Germany, Japan and 
Egypt have low scores.  Solidarities might be measured using survey data on 
identities, but only as long as respondents are given a choice between different 
kinds of identity or are asked to compare their relative importance (and all survey 
data on identity begs questions about what the respondents understood the 
question to mean and what the perceived context was).  Data from Afrobarometer 
surveys provide some evidence on how Nigerians and South Africans choose 
between cultural group identities and class identities, but I have no comparable 
data for Brazil.  Political cleavages might be measured in terms of the relationship 
between voting behaviour and class or income.  Do some parties draw 
disproportionate support from the poor, and others from the rich, or do they have 
cross-class constituencies (probably defined along cultural lines)?  Further 
research would provide precise and comparable data on this, from studies of 
voting behaviour, but at this point I have had to resort to my own judgement calls.  
Table 1 presents in very summary form the findings for three Southern countries – 
South Africa, Brazil and Nigeria – together with data on the per capital level and 



































Table 1: Summary data on South Africa, Brazil and Nigeria 
 
 South Africa Brazil Nigeria 
Per capita incomes 
(GDP per capita in US$, 
adjusted for purchasing 
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(correlation income and 
party support) 
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Public expenditure on 









(estimated decrease in 
Gini in percentage points, 
taking into account taxes, 















* It is unclear what precisely the World Bank data is measuring, hence difference between this figure and figures 
cited in the text. 
 
Sources: rows 1, 2 and 6 UNDP, Human Development Report 2002; row 3 Mauro (1995); row 4 Afrobarometer data 
(Logan & Machado, 2002: 40), combining ethnic, linguistic and religious identities as ‘cultural’ ones, occupational 
and class identities as ‘class’ ones. 
 
 
Table 1 suggests that the relationship between culture, solidarity and politics 
might be more complex than the ideal type for divided societies represented in 
Figure 1 (b).  For these three countries, there is no obvious relationship between 
cultural diversity and the salience of class-based solidarities. Nor is there an 
obvious relationship between the salience of class-based solidarity and the 
political salience of class.  When we add estimates of the scale of redistribution in 
each country, the picture gets even more muddled. In South Africa, as I shall show 





because of, the country’s previous cultural barriers.  In Brazil, almost no 
redistribution occurs despite cultural homogeneity.  Only in Nigeria is there the 
predicted coincidence of cultural diversity and no redistribution from rich to poor.  
Taking all three cases into account, there appears to be a relationship between the 
salience of class in politics and redistribution (as predicted) but not between 
cultural diversity and either political patterns or redistributive outcomes. 
 
The following sections explore the three cases of South Africa, Brazil and Nigeria 
as case-studies of the relationship between culture, politics and redistribution.  I 
shall argue for the importance of, firstly, institutional design in shaping the 
political salience of class and, secondly, class and path dependence in shaping 
redistribution. 
 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by ‘cultural diversity’.  
No society is culturally homogeneous.  All societies with any degree of social 
stratification will have some cultural differences between rich and poor.  The 
English novelist and politician, Benjamin Disraeli, coined the phrase ‘two nations’ 
to describe the cultural gulf between rich and poor in mid-nineteenth century 
Britain.  The rich and poor, he wrote, comprised ‘two nations between whom there 
is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other’s habits, 
thoughts and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of 
different planets; who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by different 
food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws’ 
(Disraeli, 1845: 74).  This kind of cultural difference is rooted in economic 
inequality.  It is very different to the kinds of cultural difference that are 
independent of economic position (or which may – in the case of apartheid South 
Africa, most obviously – be used to determine economic position).  The phrase 
‘cultural diversity’ is used in this chapter to refer to these latter forms of cultural 
difference, i.e. differences based on race, ethnicity, religion or language.  These 
are sometimes referred to as ‘vertical’ cultural cleavages, as opposed to the 
‘horizontal’ ones of class.  ‘Divided societies’ are societies divided by vertical 
cleavages, including South Africa, Malaysia and Fiji (race), the Congo and 
Nigeria (language and ethnicity), and Lebanon and India (religion).  As we shall 
see, the Brazilian case is interesting because Brazil is not a divided society in 
terms of racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic division.  But nor are cultural 
differences limited to those of class.  Regional identities are important in Brazil.  
Below I shall argue that these regional differences are in significant part the 
product of institutional design, and thus that it is institutional design rather than 








3. South Africa  
 
South Africa has been infamous in the comparative literature for two related 
reasons.  First, apartheid rendered it an apparently extreme case of a ‘divided 
society’, i.e. a society in which racial divisions supposedly render inappropriate 
the standard institutions of liberal democracy (see Horowitz, 1991; Lijphart, 
1985).  In divided societies, power-sharing between ethnic and/or racial groups 
may be considered more democratic than ‘winner-takes-all’ majoritarianism, 
because voters do not cross racial/ethnic lines, election results are therefore pre-
determined (‘racial censuses’, as Horowitz (1985) put it) and governments cease 
to be accountable in the way that Schumpeter considered essential to democracy.  
Secondly, apartheid contributed to South Africa having a very high level of 
inequality in the distribution of income (perhaps even, as is often claimed, the 
highest in the world). 
 
Being a ‘divided society’ might affect inequality and redistribution in two ways.  
Insofar as cultural diversity is fundamental to popular political attitudes, one might 
expect that demands for redistribution would occur along racial/ethnic rather than 
socio-economic class lines.  And insofar as institutions entail power-sharing, 
demands for redistribution might be frustrated by institutional constraints.  
Political elites would operate within these parameters through necessity not 
choice.  Cultural diversity would determine patterns of economic solidarity, but 
the ensuing demands would be held in check by institutional design. 
 
Is this pattern observable in South Africa?  Hardly.  Let us start with a number of 
stylised facts about distribution and redistribution in South Africa (see further 
Seekings and Nattrass, forthcoming): 
 
1. In the first half of the apartheid period, there was a close relationship 
between race and class, but the relationship weakened in the later apartheid 
years and has continued to weaken rapidly after the end of apartheid.  The 
relationship has weakened not because of growing numbers of poor white 
people, but because of rising intra-racial inequality within the majority 
black population.  At the top end, the black middle-class and elite has been 
growing rapidly.  At the bottom end, unemployment confines many to 
chronic poverty in a society without significant subsistence agriculture (see 
Crankshaw, 1997; Whiteford and van Seventer, 2000; Nattrass and 
Seekings, 2001a; Bhorat et al., 2001).  
 
2. Tax revenues were redistributed from rich to poor and across racial lines, 





and even more so after apartheid.  By 1993, taxes, public welfare and the 
value of free or subsidised public education, health care and other services 
reduced the Gini coefficient for the distribution of ‘income’ from 0.68 to 
0.5 (McGrath et al., 1997).  By 1997, just three years after the country’s 
first democratic elections, the Gini coefficient was reduced to an estimated 
0.44 (Van der Berg, 2001a, 2001b).  The scale of these reductions is almost 
certainly unmatched in the South.  
 
3. This redistribution rests on three main pillars: a system of taxation that 
revolves around the efficient collection of income tax, very high enrolment 
rates in primary and even secondary school, and a public welfare system 
focused on generous and wide-ranging social assistance (including, 
especially, non-contributory and effectively universal old-age pensions).  
All three of these pillars were constructed prior to the transition to 
democracy, each on its own is unusual in the South, and the combination is 
exceptional.  
 
4. Inequality persists despite this redistribution in part because government 
policies, both under and after apartheid, promote an economic growth path 
based on productivity (and wage) increases rather than job creation.  In 
other words, government policies with respect to the growth path (including 
labour market policies) tend to worsen inequality whilst social policies 
mitigate it. 
 
Perhaps the most important question to be asked of South Africa is not the 
standard “why don’t the poor get more?” but rather “why do the poor get so 
much?” in terms of active re-distribution.  The progressive incidence of social 
expenditures occurs not because the poor exercised their power as voters to extract 
resources from the better off, nor because they joined with better off citizens in 
support of policies that protected them against the risk of poverty.  In South 
Africa, the poor did not have the vote until long after redistributive social policies 
were put in place.  South Africa is a case of, primarily, redistribution from above.  
The history can be divided into four periods: 
 
i. In the pre-1940 period, public welfare was established for white and 
coloured people through a combination of immigrant white working-class 
power (through both direct action, in the 1922 Rand Revolt, and the ballot 
box) and the social and economic solidarity present in emergent Afrikaner 
nationalist politics (support for ‘poor whites’, mostly people who had been 
displaced from the countryside, lacked competitive skills in urban labour 





private support).  Unusually, and probably because of the latter factor, the 
welfare system entailed a hefty dose of social assistance alongside social 
insurance.  
 
ii. In the 1940s, this racially exclusive system was extended to black (and 
Indian people), through a combination of the power of ideas (including 
some multi-racial solidarity) among some elites, in the context of war, and 
concern among administrators and major industrial employers (notably, the 
mines) over the consequences of what they saw as the collapse of peasant 
production and hence agrarian society in the black ‘reserves’.   
 
iii. After the election of the National Party to government in 1948, the state 
considered the possibility of dismantling the multi-racial public welfare 
system, but the politics of retrenchment proved different to the politics of 
expansion.  For two decades, the apartheid state resorted to minimising 
redistribution through widened racial discrimination in benefit levels.   
 
iv. From around 1970, the National Party sought to appear non-racial and 
slowly removed racial discrimination in benefit levels, finally achieving 
parity in 1993.  In neither this period nor the preceding, early apartheid 
period was there evidence of cross-racial solidarity on the part of either the 
white electorate or the state.   
 
The story of taxation is not very different: an efficient state relied on income taxes 
and taxes on gold production through most of the twentieth century.  Income tax 
revenues grew fast, in relation to GDP, in the First World War, and again in the 
war years of the early 1940s (jumping from less than 2% to more than 6% of 
GDP).  In the early apartheid period income tax revenues actually declined 
somewhat, but then rose rapidly again from the mid-1960s.  By the time of the 
transition to democracy, income tax had come to account for 14% of GDP 
(Lieberman, 2001).  The provision of public education is rather different.  Here 
there was – in 1976 and again in the mid-1980s – dramatic evidence of pressures 
from below for reform.  The expansion of schooling reflected the combination of 
these pressures from below with the growing needs of employers for a more 
skilled workforce.  
 
South Africa is exceptional today primarily because it was exceptional before 
1994.  It is very unlikely that South Africa’s tax and welfare systems could be put 
in place from scratch today, in a democratic polity.  This is not to downplay the 
leverage that democracy has brought to poorer citizens.  Social policy is the most 





Congress, ANC) has used the construction of schools and clinics in rural areas to 
good political effect – especially in those areas where it has faced real political 
competition (for example, parts of the Eastern Cape in the 1999 general election, 
when challenged by a new party co-led by a former ANC leader).  Nor does 
emphasising the importance of path dependence mean that the attitudes of the 
post-apartheid rich are irrelevant.  White South Africans might be ambivalent 
about policies of affirmative action (promoting the black middle-class) but are 
generally supportive of a range of measures to redistribute to the poor.  Since 
1994, the political parties representing most white South Africans have 
consistently supported the social policies that entail active redistribution. 
 
The analysis by Lieberman (2001) of the history of taxation in South Africa 
provides a possible explanation of social policies also.  Lieberman focuses on 
intra-racial solidarity. He argues that upper-income white people were willing to 
pay high income taxes because the state was ‘their’ state.  Tax revenues could 
legitimately be used to finance war or to address poverty among ‘poor whites’.  It 
was racial ‘glue’ that bound rich, white taxpayers to the state, allowing income 
taxes to be hiked repeatedly.  Intra-racial white solidarity might similarly explain 
the construction of a welfare state for white South Africans, financed by the taxes 
paid by a white elite. 
 
Lieberman’s thesis invites two lines of criticism.  First, was the assumed solidarity 
on the part of the richer white tax-payers the strong kind of within-group solidarity 
or the weaker kind of concessionary solidarity?  To what extent were rich white 
tax-payers paying up because they recognised the need for intra-white political 
compromise, in the face of the political or industrial power of poorer white 
classes, and to what extent were they forging a united front with poorer white 
classes against the swart gevaar (i.e. black peril)?  The class, regional and ethnic 
divisions within the white population should not be ignored so readily.  Secondly, 
Lieberman overlooks the importance, at least in political rhetoric, of a more 
inclusive concept of the nation at key moments, notably the war years of the early 
1940s.  The state was quite open in acknowledging that its reforms of social policy 
entailed redistribution from white to black people, recognising that black South 
Africans had some social rights in a common society.  Both the self-interest and 
the moral rhetoric of white elites sometimes cut across racial lines.  The 
complexity of tax-payers’ ‘solidarity’ becomes more apparent when we consider 
the late apartheid period, when the state began to commit very substantial funds to 
education, health care, housing and welfare for black people.  Inter-racial 
redistribution surely reflects a class-cum-racial compromise: fear of expropriation 
(including crime), guilt, recognition of past inequity and a sense of justice may all 






The ways in which cultural diversity shape solidarity and redistribution in South 
Africa are clearly determined by the country’s specific history of racial politics.  
White elites are unusually willing to concede redistribution and strike a social 
democratic compromise because of the close relationship between race and class.  
At the same time, there is strong solidarity among black South Africans – 
spanning growing intra-racial class differences and continuing intra-racial ethnic 
diversity – because race remains fundamental to political attitudes.  Racial politics 
also makes it easier for the ANC to play an integrating role, preventing the 
fragmentation of a ‘nationalist’ movement into competing ethnic, regional or 
class-based factions.   
 
Why don’t the poor get more?  Redistribution in South Africa is no more 
constrained by power-sharing than it is by cultural diversity.  After a brief period 
of power-sharing under an interim constitution (lauded by the high priest of 
power-sharing, Arend Lijphart (1994)), South Africa has not had recognisably 
consociational institutions.  Minority groups have neither the right to sharing 
power in the executive, nor any corporate veto over policies affecting them.  The 
dominant party – the ANC – might be a broad church, but it is not so inclusive as 
to accommodate most members of the minority racial groups.  Would power-
sharing have inhibited redistribution?  Probably not.  The experience of power-
sharing in the 1994-96 period does not suggest any limitation on redistribution: 
the National Party, then part of the Government of National Unity, supported the 
ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme.  The Democratic Alliance, 
which was the largest opposition party after 1999, implemented redistributive 
policies in the provinces and municipalities under its control.   
 
The major obstacle to redistribution to the poor in post-apartheid South Africa is 
probably not the rich white elite as much as the black middle-class and perhaps 
even the black organised working-class because these classes seek to capture the 
benefits of inter-racial redistribution.  Inter-racial redistribution does not mean that 
benefits reach the truly poor.  Indeed, the available data on post-1994 trends 
suggests that the black middle-class has enjoyed huge gains whilst the black poor 
have, if anything, grown poorer still (Whiteford and Van Seventer, 2000; Seekings 
and Nattrass, forthcoming).  The black middle- and working-classes are both 
powerful within the multi-class coalition represented by the ANC.  It serves the 
ANC leadership to play the race card, to maintain a coalition with its own internal 
strains, but the rhetoric of politics should not be misconstrued as an analysis of the 
politics of public policy-making. 
 





electoral system (combining closed-list proportional representation with just ten 
very large electoral districts) together with restrictions on ‘floor-crossing’ (i.e. on 
Members of Parliament defecting from one party to another) concentrates 
awesome power in the party leaderships.  This centralisation renders largely 
irrelevant the provisions in the constitution for weak federalism and the separation 
of legislative and executive powers.  The centralisation of power within the ANC 
allows the executive to resist demands for redistribution.  In a constituency-based 
electoral system, or one where power in political parties is more dispersed, the 
poor might exercise greater leverage over legislators and hence the executive.  For 
this reason, conservative commentators sometimes voice approval of the system.  
The importance of the centralisation of power was evident in recent debates on 
welfare reform, focused on the proposed introduction of a universal, non-
contributory ‘basic income grant’.  The recommendation by an official 
commission of inquiry that a basic income grant be introduced was supported 
widely within the ANC, but the top ANC leadership suppressed serious debate 
and kept the issue off the real policy agenda.  
 
In fact, demands for redistribution appear to be relatively muted.  Contrary to 
scholars’ expectations (e.g. Herbst, 1993), the available evidence suggests that the 
poor themselves have limited (or ‘realistic’) expectations of change (Charney, 
1995; Johnson and Schlemmer, 1996; Nattrass and Seekings, 1998).  Elsewhere I 
have argued that a key factor constraining demands for redistribution is the 
opacity of public policy.  Poor citizens can see, and oppose, self-enrichment by 
officials, incompetence or corruption in the administration of old-age pensions, 
and even the government’s tardiness in increasing welfare payments in line with 
inflation.  But it is less easy to see how the government is responsible for what 
people see, rightly, as the major cause of poverty: unemployment.  Surveys of 
public opinion routinely find that unemployment is identified as the most 
important problem facing the country, and that an overwhelming majority of the 
electorate (including the ANC’s own supporters) assess negatively the 
government’s performance.  But they do not hold the government responsible, and 
do not seek to punish the ANC electorally.  The people holding high expectations 
– and potentially therefore disappointment – are not the poor, but rather the 
relatively privileged urban industrial working-class and black middle-class.  The 
poor do not get more in part because they are not demanding more (Nattrass and 
Seekings, 2001b).  To what extent these attitudes are the product or outcome of 
the political system – in that a different system might foster more critical attitudes 









In at least two respects, Brazil is very similar to South Africa.  First, there is a high 
level of inequality in the distribution of income.  The Gini coefficient for 
disposable income has been estimated consistently at about 0.6 for the past twenty 
years.  As in South Africa, inequality (of disposable income) might have worsened 
somewhat since the transition to democracy in the mid-1980s (Psacharopoulos et 
al., 1997).  Second, the country’s first fully democratic presidential election was 
held as recently as 1989, just five years before South Africa’s first democratic 
general election; in the elections held in periods of civilian rule up to 1964, many 
citizens had failed to satisfy a literacy qualification.  Unlike South Africa, minimal 
redistribution from rich to poor is effected through the budget in Brazil, and 
democratisation has been slow to have a major effect on this.  The lack of 
redistribution in Brazil cannot be attributed to the country being a ‘divided 
society’, but seems to reflect overwhelmingly institutional design. 
 
In Brazil, as in South Africa, the rich are super-rich, with the top income decile 
accounting for over one half of total Brazilian income, and the top two deciles 
together accounting for two-thirds of total income (Psacharopoulos et al., 1997).  
Also as in South Africa, the poor live disproportionately in rural areas.  Brazil is a 
society that has undergone massive urbanisation over recent decades, with rural 
areas left far behind in developmental terms.  Poverty is most acute in the North-
east region (home to one-third of the population but two-thirds of the poor).  But 
the causes of poverty in Brazil are not the same as in South Africa.  The Brazilian 
poor are poor not so much because they are unemployed as because they are 
working for very low earnings in the informal sector.  Brazil’s unemployment rate 
is, in the bottom income quintile, only 10% in urban areas and 1% in rural areas, 
compared to an aggregate 70% in South Africa.  Informal sector employment 
stands at 73% of the labour force in the bottom quintile in Brazil.  A second 
difference between Brazil and South Africa is the importance of education.  In 
South Africa, school enrolment is high, even in the poorest areas, and the returns 
to school education are generally low.  In Brazil, enrolment rates are low, and 
there are high returns to each additional year of schooling.  Inequality in the 
distribution of income in Brazil is closely related to inequity in the distribution of 
human capital (Lam, 1999).  The adult illiteracy rate in the bottom income quintile 
is about 43%.  In this quintile, as many as one in three children aged 7 to 14 are 
not attending primary school and as many as 95% of 15 to 19 year-olds are not 
attending secondary school (Camargo and Ferreira, 2000). 
 
Brazil’s growth path in the twentieth century was not unlike South Africa’s 





concentrated benefits in specific, mostly non-poor social groups.  Deliberate 
import substitution industrialisation ensured higher incomes for employers and 
workers in protected sectors, including public administration and public utilities.  
As in South Africa, organised urban workers secured minimum wage and social 
security programmes before the Second World War.  Unlike South Africa, 
however, these programmes had the objective of maintaining the incomes of 
urban workers and their families if the bread-winning worker became 
unemployed, sick, disabled, died, or to provide funds in his (and occasionally her) 
retirement. Social security was focused on corporatist social insurance, on the 
German model, not universal social assistance; coverage was intentionally limited 
to exclude most of the poor (Malloy, 1979).  Public education and health care was 
also expanded slowly from urban middle-classes to urban working-class, and 
public housing targeted urban working-class.  In 1963 and 1970, reforms extended 
some benefits to rural workers also.  Despite these limited reforms, social policies 
continue today to be very poorly targeted to the poor.  Social policies absorb two-
thirds of government spending and (in 1998) about 21% of GDP, but benefit the 
middle-classes and rich disproportionately. 
 
The three pillars of redistribution in South Africa are all absent in Brazil.  First, 
and crucially, education in Brazil is highly unequal. In contrast to South Africa, 
enrolment rates in public schools remain low in poor areas.  Most of the 
beneficiaries of public secondary schooling are in the third and fourth quintiles, 
and almost all of the beneficiaries of the massive public spending on tertiary 
education are in the top quintile (Von Amsberg et al., 2000; see also Camargo and 
Ferreira, 2000).  The shares of public expenditure on primary and secondary 
schooling going to the bottom quintile is about 20% and less than 10% 
respectively in Brazil (ibid), compared to an aggregate figure of almost 30% in 
South Africa by 1997 (Van der Berg, 2001a).  Secondly, social security 
programmes, with the exception of some minor programmes such as the free milk 
and school lunch programmes, are highly regressive.  Pension benefits are linked 
to lifetime earnings and concentrated heavily on formal sector workers.  The 
Constitution itself guarantees generous benefits to civil servants, set at 100% of 
salary at retirement.  These pensions are contributory in that only past contributors 
are eligible, but most benefits are paid for from general revenues and therefore 
pose a huge and rapidly rising burden on the fiscus.  Huge benefits are paid to the 
relatively well off, but less than 20% of pensions are paid to households in the 
poorest three quintiles.  Unemployment insurance reaches the second and third 
quintiles, but the bulk is captured by the rich and the poorest quintile barely 
benefit (Von Amsberg et al., 2000; see also World Bank, 2002).  Overall, social 
spending is regressive across quintiles (IADB, 1999), in contrast to South Africa.  





1995 went to the bottom quintile, rather less than the 33% estimated for South 
Africa by Van der Berg (2001a: 148). Thirdly, only 18% of tax revenues come 
from taxes on income or profit (World Bank, 2002).  Information on Brazilian 
taxes is hard to come by, but in Latin America as a whole, tax systems are 
regressive because income tax rates are low, loopholes abound, and indirect taxes 
are high (IADB, 1999). 
 
Attitude surveys suggest that there is, in Brazil as in Latin America as a whole, 
strong support for the redistribution of income, public health care, and public 
assistance for the elderly and the unemployed (Latinobarometer data, cited in 
IADB, 1999).  Data from the World Values Survey suggests that support for 
equality-enhancing state policies is lower than in South Africa, but is nonetheless 
strong (see Table A3 in the Appendix).  Indeed, some surveys suggest that 
Brazilians are unusual in the extent to which they prioritise equality over 
democracy (see Turner & Elordi, 1995).  Lower classes are more egalitarian than 
higher ones (ibid).  But even among elites there is ‘great sensibility to the 
problems of poverty and inequality’ (Reis, 2000: 183).  Poor education and high 
levels of poverty and inequality are seen by elites as major obstacles to democracy 
and as key objects of national policy in the medium-term (ibid). 
 
Since democratisation in 1985, successive federal governments have sought to 
reform social policies and the associated taxation system.  Weyland (1997) 
provides a detailed study of reform initiatives between 1985 and 1994, i.e. before 
the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso as president.  In each of three areas – 
taxation, social security and health care – reforms were initiated primarily by 
progressive technocrats and were frustrated by powerful vested interests.  This 
pattern repeated precisely the politics of reform prior to 1964 (see Malloy, 1979).  
In the case of social security reform after 1985, opposition came from 
conservative bureaucrats, defending the existing rules and procedures, the Finance 
Ministry, fearful of increased budgetary demands; and, above all, sectional 
pressures.  Trade unions were opposed to any curbs on their privileges under the 
existing system – that benefited them handsomely – and even opposed the 
extension of non-contributory or subsidised benefits to people poorer than 
themselves.  The rural poor were themselves divided, with the rural workers’ 
unions agreeing to a compromise with employers whereby social security 
provisions were extended to salaried rural workers (a reform that was 
subsequently shelved).  The rural and urban poor lacked effective voices in the 
political arena.  The federal Congress was dominated by clientelist politicians who 
sought to maximise the resources available for discretionary patronage, and had 
little interest in reforms that meant that benefits would be non-discretionary 





security system.  Almost immediately, fiscal crisis required massive cuts in 
benefits.  The federal government proposed that benefit cuts (for the privileged) be 
combined with making low benefits universal, for the first time.  Vested interests 
forestalled this reform, as they did also reforms of the tax and public health 
systems.   
 
In 1994, Cardoso was elected on an explicitly progressive ticket.  In his inaugural 
address he emphasised that social justice would be the ‘number one objective of 
my administration’.  He claimed a mandate ‘from those that have been excluded’ 
and warned that, if necessary, he would ‘do away with the privileges of the few to 
do justice to the vast majority of Brazilians’.  The great challenge would be to 
decrease inequalities and do away with the ‘patronage, corporativism and 
corruption [that] drain away the taxpayer’s money before it reaches’ its rightful 
beneficiaries (Cardoso, 1999).  Rhetorically, Cardoso was similar to his 
contemporaries in the ANC leadership in South Africa.  The Cardoso 
governments did attempt a series of reforms of social policy.  Constitutional 
amendments limited marginally the state’s obligations to civil servants on 
retirement.  Reforms of health spending improved the efficiency with which the 
poor were targeted.  The government established several new federal welfare 
programmes in 1995: the Communidade Solidária programme, distributing free 
food to poor communities, and a number of programmes involving partnership 
between state, civil society and private sector.  In 1996, the government sponsored 
a constitutional amendment to facilitate federal spending on primary schools, 
improving teachers’ salaries and providing for the Bolsa-Escola programme.  This 
programme provides means-tested, conditional cash transfers, where the condition 
for the transfer is school attendance.  Initiated in the Brasilia Federal District in 
1995, by the newly-elected Worker’s Party (PT, in Portuguese) governor, 
decentralised Bolsa-Escola (school scholarship) programmes had been 
implemented in perhaps one hundred municipalities by the end of 2000, reaching 
about 100 000 families, one quarter of them in Brasilia (Lavinas, 2001).  Coverage 
was thus very limited, in terms of both municipalities and the poor in participating 
municipalities.  In Belo Horizonte, the programme reached 8% of families (ibid).  
Just prior to the 1998 presidential elections, the federal government launched a 
programme, meeting half of the cost of Bolsa-Escola programmes in poorer 
municipalities.  The government claimed that 504 000 families benefited over the 
following year (ibid).  Assessments of Bolsa-Escola programmes indicate that 
they raise school attendance and reduce grade repetition, and are well targeted on 
the poor, but they barely scratch the surface of poverty (ibid; Lavinas et al., 2001).  
In mid-2001, however, the Federal Bolsa-Escola programme was expanded, and 
by early 2002 reached nearly 5 million families, including over 8 million children 






Scholars of Brazil emphasise the role of institutions in frustrating reform and 
ensuring the perpetuation of policies that protect the privileged or relatively 
privileged.  Few political systems have so many veto points.  Federalism 
constrains the power of the centre; the separation of powers impedes reformist 
presidents; the electoral system breeds individualism among politicians and 
undermines party discipline; and existing policies provide politicians with the 
resources to uphold patronage politics.  All can be traced back to the 
circumstances of what was an undoubtedly conservative transition to democracy 
(Hagopian, 1996; Power, 2000).  The military were able to ensure the election of 
conservative politicians heading regional political machines – as many as 40% of 
the members of the 1987-91 Congress were former members of the military-
backed party prior to 1985 (Power, 2000) – leading to the adoption of a 
conservative constitution in 1988 (Montero, 2000).  
 
Reform is constrained most obviously by the institutional power of conservative 
politicians from rural states.  Seats in Congress do not reflect the demographics of 
the country.  The Sao Paulo state has 22% of the population but only 12% of the 
seats, whilst the seven smallest states have, between them, 4% of the population 
but elect 25% of the Senate and 10% of the lower chamber.  The Senate, which is 
especially disproportional, has unusual power to do away with legislation coming 
from the lower state.  The constitution reduces further the powers of the centre by 
requiring the transfer of federal funding to the states and municipalities. The result 
is, in Stepan’s analysis, ‘demos-constraining’ (Stepan, 2000).  The reason for this 
is that many of the states, including especially the poorer states, are dominated by 
oligarchic elites. 
 
The power of oligarchic elites is rooted, to a large extent, in the electoral system 
of open-list proportional representation (PR) for legislatures.  Open-list PR entails 
seats being allocated to parties according to the share of the vote won by each 
party’s candidates, but is allocated within parties to candidates on the basis of 
which individuals won the most votes.  When combined with small electoral 
districts but without restrictions on floor-crossing, open-list PR results in a 
predominance of individualist politicians who seek to build personalised support 
bases through clientelism and change parties frequently (more than half of the 
members of the 1991-94 federal Congress switched parties – Mainwaring, 1999; 
see further Ames, 2001).  In stark contrast to South Africa, party discipline is 
extremely weak (Mainwaring, 1999).  Congress is paralysed, with presidents 
having to form coalitions out of individualist legislators nominally combined into 
parties.  The parties of the left (the PT) and centre-left (including Cardoso’s Social 





they account between them for little more than one-third of the congressional 
vote and a still smaller proportion of the actual seats in Congress.   
 
Progressive reforms by the Federal government are frequently frustrated by some 
combination of the division of powers under the federal constitution, the self-
interest of bureaucrats and politicians, or the vested interests of powerful 
constituencies (such as trade unions, in the case of pension reform).  Pro-reform 
coalitions have proved to be viable in some surprising areas of policy, including 
trade policy (Kingstone, 1999), but not with regard to social policies.  It is at the 
sub-national level that some of the more significant reforms have been effected.  
Tendler (1997) has analysed a rare case of ‘good government’, in the 
impoverished North-eastern state of Ceara between 1987 and 1994.  PT municipal 
administrations have also attracted considerable laudatory attention, although most 
is focused on innovative procedures rather than substantive policy outcomes (e.g. 
Abers, 2000) – and most of these PT administrations have been in the relatively 
prosperous South and South-east.  Experiences in Ceara and PT-administered 
states and municipalities lead Montero (2000) to suggest that federalism is not 
unambiguously demos-constraining, as Stepan argued; rather, it opens spaces for 
progressive initiatives at sub-national levels.  The distributional consequences of 
federalism depend on the politics at state and municipal levels.  Notwithstanding 
the success of the PT and other reformist candidates, most of the poorest parts of 
the country continue to be dominated by elected oligarchic elites.   
 
Why do so many poor voters vote for regionally-based, conservative 
representatives rather than for the PT or other reformist candidates espousing pro-
poor programmes?  Even in the presidential elections, dominated by centre-left 
and left candidates (Cardoso, Lula), poor voters have tended to vote for the more 
conservative candidates.  There is no relationship between income or class and 
voting behaviour in presidential elections.  Indeed, the left’s persistent presidential 
candidate, Lula, tended to do better among slightly better off voters than his less 
radical opponents (Mainwaring, 1999).  The explanation is clearly not ‘cultural 
diversity’, given that Brazil has a very low level of ethno-linguistic fragmentation; 
Brazilians are united by religion and language, and race does not appear to be a 
factor in voting behaviour.  Rather, most studies emphasise that Brazilian voting 
behaviour is contingent on the political context: an electoral and political system 
that encourages individualism among politicians and regionalism in federal 
politics combines with a policy environment that gives politicians huge 
discretionary power over the allocation of resources.  In this context, poor 
Brazilians acquiesce in a regionalist, oligarchic and inegalitarian system, giving 
their votes to regionally-based politicians who promise patronage not 





unlike ‘quiescent’ or ‘deferential’ sections of the poor in America (Gaventa, 
1980) or Britain (Newby, 1977).  
 
The absence of ethnic, religious or linguistic fragmentation and the limited 
political salience of race does not mean that Brazil is culturally homogeneous.  
Brazil is clearly not the non-racial society that Freyre and others applauded for so 
long; race is more of a factor in social and economic life than has generally been 
acknowledged.  But racial consciousness and identity are extremely complex in 
Brazil.  Racial categories even appear to be malleable, with upwardly mobile 
black Brazilians becoming ‘whiter’ over time both in terms of their own identity 
and how they are perceived by others.  More importantly for our argument, 
however, is that race has rarely been politicised in Brazil.  Racially-based political 
or other movements have failed to attract support.  Twentieth-century Brazil was 
never a racialised polity in a sense remotely resembling apartheid or even post-
apartheid South Africa. 
 
More importantly, regional identities – and stereotypes – are important in Brazil.  
Poor voters in rural regions typically vote for regionally-based patrons in 
conservative parties rather than for candidates from the programmatic, pro-poor 
PT.  People in the wealthier regions typically view people from the poorer north-
east in very derogatory terms.  What is unclear is whether such regional identities 
and prejudices are the cause or the product of a political system that promotes 
regionalism.  Citizens vote for patrons who promise and succeed in delivering 
‘pork’ to regional and sub-regional constituencies, and often follow the 
recommendation of regional leaders in voting for federal candidates (including 
candidates for the presidency) who the regional leader has himself endorsed (in 
return for promises of patronage).  Do federalism and open list PR accommodate 
such practices or cause them?  The absence of both redistribution and cultural 
diversity compels us to examine whether both are not, in some way, the 
consequence of the interaction between regional identities and the design of 
Brazil’s political institutions. Federalism, the electoral system and the 
discretionary nature of so much public spending means that elites and citizens 
behave in the kinds of ways that we might expect if this had been a ‘divided 
society’ rent by immovable cultural divisions.  Might this also be true in a society 









5. Nigeria   
 
If one wanted a good example of a society where cultural divisions appear 
especially implacable, look no further than Nigeria.  The ‘national question’ has 
dominated Nigerian politics since before independence in 1960.  Nigeria adopted 
a federal constitution to try to contain the tensions between the predominantly 
Muslim, Hausa-speaking North, the predominantly Christian, Yoruba-speaking 
South-west and the predominantly Christian, Igbo-speaking South-east.  But 
despite – or because of – the federal arrangements, inter-regional/ethnic tensions 
intensified, culminating in the attempted secession of the South-east (‘Biafra’) and 
civil war between 1967 and 1970.  Following the war, Nigerian politics was 
dominated by northerners in a succession of military regimes, interrupted briefly 
by the corrupt civilian governments of the Second Republic (1979-83).  Regional 
tensions worsened when the (northern) military annulled the results of a 
presidential election in 1993, aborting the promised transition to democracy, when 
it appeared that a candidate from the south-west had won.   
 
Since the most recent transition to democracy, in 1999, Nigeria has been plagued 
by ethnically-divided elite politics.  Ethnic organisations have proliferated, 
wielding considerable influence in national politics.  Yoruba interests are 
advanced by the Oodua People’s Congress (named after Oduduwa, the mythical 
father figure of Yorubas), until its banning in 2000, and the traditionalist Yoruba 
movement, Afenifere.  Eastern elites have an umbrella organisation of their own, 
Ohaneze.  A northern pressure group, the Arewa Consultative Forum (chaired by 
former military president, Gowon), formed the Arewa People’s Congress to 
advance northern interests.  In other parts of the country, too, ethnic minorities 
have their own organisations, most notably the Ijaw National Congress and other 
groups in the oil-producing region of the Niger delta.  Prominent politicians and 
intellectuals voice doubts as to the coherence of Nigeria, demanding even that 
Nigeria become a confederation.  At the same time, communal violence sweeps 
across the country.  Most recently, northern cities were engulfed in religious riots.   
 
Analyses of Nigerian politics and society are plagued by a lack of good data on 
key issues.  First, there is almost no readily available data on inequality.  The 
Federal government conducted national household surveys in 1985/86 and 
1992/93 (see World Bank, 1996), and there are a number of more recent local 
studies (see e.g. Adesina, 2000, for 1993 data from South-western Nigeria).  Such 
studies report high and rising Gini coefficients, but the variation is considerable 
and the quality of the data questionable.  There is some data on perceptions of 
inequality.  The 1995 World Value Survey found most Nigerians agreeing that 





share of the population is poor than ten years ago’ and that ‘people are poor 
because society treats them unfairly’ (rather than because they are lazy and lack 
will power).  See Table A2 in the Appendix. Nigerians were more supportive of 
income differences, as incentives for individual effort, than South Africans and 
Brazilians, and more likely to agree that ‘people can only get rich at the expense 
of others’.  The 2000 Afrobarometer survey also found strong support for greater 
equality in income distribution and for meeting people’s basic needs (Bratton and 
Lewis, 2000).   
 
What most attitude surveys do not detect, however, is probably more important.  
Astute commentators agree that a sense of marginalisation is widespread among 
the Igbo people from the East, among the Yoruba in the West, among the 
country’s many ethnic minorities – among just about everybody, that is, except 
perhaps the Hausa/Fulani people of the north (Mustapha, 2000).  These kinds of 
perceptions are difficult to identify and assess in attitude surveys.  The 
Afrobarometer surveys, unusually, have probed whether Nigerians feel 
discriminated against. 
Much depends on the way the question is asked.  Overall, relatively few 
Nigerians (11.7 percent) feel that the economic conditions of their 
group are ‘worse than the economic conditions of other groups in the 
country.’  Almost twice as many respondents (20.3 percent) were 
willing to agree that their group ‘is always (or) to a large extent … 
treated unfairly by the government.’  And a middling proportion (18.7 
percent) felt that the government overlooks the interests of ‘all 
Nigerians’ in order to represent ‘just a few groups or the interests of one 
group only.’ (Bratton and Lewis, 2000: 26).   
 
Nigerians with a class identity are more likely to feel aggrieved than Nigerians 
with stronger ethnic, religious or linguistic identities.  Some ethnic groups (such as 
Ijaw-speakers) are more aggrieved at discrimination than others (such as Hausa-
speakers).  Qualitative work (and perhaps the use of experimental vignettes in 
surveys) would be invaluable in shedding fresh light on these issues.   
 
There is a similar lack of data on the incidence of public expenditures.  There is 
little accounting for public revenues, even since the transition to democracy in 
1999, and Nigerian public finances are in a mess.  In 2002, when the lower 
legislative chamber initiated impeachment proceedings against President 
Obasanjo, the counts included the executive’s failure to implement Appropriation 
Acts and spending money without authorisation. 
 





inequality, within regions as well as nationally.  Second, state policies are likely 
to be highly regressive, with an extraordinary share of state expenditures captured 
by national and regional elites.  And, thirdly, ordinary as well as elite Nigerians 
tend to view their society in ethnic or religious terms.  The questions for us here 
are, then: to what extent are the ethnic (or religious) patterns in Nigerian politics 
the product of a primordial cultural diversity and to what extent are they the 
product of a struggle for spoils in a specific institutional context?  To what extent 
are they the cause and to what extent are they the consequence of political 
conflict? 
 
Without better evidence, we can only answer these questions indirectly.  First, 
Nigerian politics is clearly structured by the consequences of oil production.  Up 
to and at independence, Nigeria was a society of peasants, with no large 
landowners and very little industry.  The nascent middle-class was based in public 
sector employment and commerce.  Government revenue came from taxes 
imposed on agricultural marketing boards and, at the local level, various poll 
taxes.  This all changed with the oil boom of the 1970s. State revenues rose by as 
much as 40% per year during the 1970s, with oil revenues contributing over 80% 
of total state revenue.  The oil boom transformed the relationships between 
government, state and society.  Control of state expenditure became, more than 
ever before, the route to enrichment.  As a long series of scholars have shown, 
elite politics in Nigeria revolves around competition for control of the state and its 
oil revenues.  ‘Simply put’, writes Ibeanu (1998: 18), ‘state power guarantees 
access to petrodollars’.  Nigerian politics became an intra-elite struggle for spoils 
(Forrest, 1986).  Richard Joseph (1987) has analysed this in terms of 
‘prebendalism’, using the Weberian notion of a prebend as the use of public office 
for private enrichment.  Both military and civilian regimes have maintained power 
by distributing public resources through decentralised patronage networks.  Under 
the post-1984 military regimes, such prebendalism gave way to a more naked 
‘predation’ and ‘decentralised clientelist rule’ was replaced by ‘purely avaricious 
dictatorship’ with the concentration of coercive and financial power in the 
personal hands of military strongmen (Lewis, 1999).  The presidency assumed 
many of the functions of the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank.  Two-
thirds of public expenditure (equal to about 17% of GDP) occurred outside of the 
federal budget, i.e. was entirely discretionary.  The Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation never published accounts.  Corruption took place on a previously 
unimaginable scale.  The centralisation of power, especially under the military 
after 1984, meant that the supposedly federal state became a de facto unitary state 
(Othman and Williams, 1999; Suberu, 2001).  
 





changed relative prices in the economy.  This was the setting for the 
intensification of religious tensions in the North.  The collapse of agriculture and a 
boom in urban construction in the late 1970s led to rapid urbanisation.  In northern 
cities, material grievances and resentment of official corruption provided fertile 
ground for the growth of fundamentalist Islam.  Preaching a fundamentalist and 
fiercely anti-materialist message, a charismatic local leader in Kano known as 
‘Maitatsine’ attracted a substantial following among the urban poor.  In December 
1979, the police and army battled with Maitatsine’s followers for five days.  The 
strengthening of religious identities is the result of economic hardship and 
political alienation (Mustapha, 2000).  In the (Niger) Delta area in the South, 
strains in the agricultural economy combined with resentment of the 
environmental degradation accompanying oil production and of the failure of the 
state to return oil revenues to the areas where the oil was produced, led to revolt 
against the federal government.   
 
The transformation of public finance affects profoundly the relationship between 
state and society.  Guyer (1992) examines the changing nature and consequences 
of local taxation in one area of South-west Nigeria (Ibarapa).  In Europe, taxation 
was institutionalised under non-democratic rule, democracy was constructed 
around struggles to control public revenue, so that there developed a close 
relationship between the obligations of taxation and the rights of democracy.  
British colonial administrations sought to replicate this process in Nigeria.  Taxes 
were initially viewed as a colonial imposition but achieved some legitimacy 
around independence.  In the South-west, the imposition of taxes to pay for the 
civil war promoted rebellion.  Taxes were illegitimate in a context in which 
expenditures were questioned and there was no consent mechanism.  As oil 
revenues flooded into state coffers, the state completed the task of dismantling the 
colonial tax system, especially at the local level.  Taxes were not even raised 
during the austerity measures of the mid-1980s.  Effective tax rates are very low: 
Translated into a proportion of a man’s cash income (i.e. not including 
the cash value of income in kind from the farm and not reflecting the 
cash costs of production), the tax paid by the male Ibarapa farmer or 
trader in 1968 at the time of the [anti-tax] revolt was about 8 percent; in 
1980 tax was about 1 percent, and in 1988 was under 2 percent for a 
poor farmer and literally disappeared as a percentage of the net income 
of a successful farmer with ten acres.  The annual tax in 1988 was 
considerably less than the amount a farmer might contribute as a minor 
participant in a single funeral ceremony, a chieftaincy installation, or as 
a purchaser of a single round of three Harp beers among friends. 






Nigerian citizens are not tax-payers, and debates over public policy are not 
framed in terms of the implications for tax-paying citizens.  Groups compete for a 
larger share of public revenues, not for the better use of taxes, and there is no basis 
for demanding that the wealthy pay tax. 
 
Between 1946 and 2000, no fewer than nine separate commissions investigated 
revenue-sharing in Nigeria, and not one came up with a generally accepted 
formula or rules for revising the formula (Suberu, 2001).  Between 1966 and 
1979, the federal government allocated funds to states on the basis of a formula 
with just two elements: half of all funds were allocated on the basis of population 
(rendering censuses intensely political) and half on the basis of an equal share to 
each state (providing a strong incentive to state fragmentation).  With the arrival 
of massive oil revenues, an additional ‘derivation principle’ was added: a fixed 
percentage would be ear-marked for the oil-producing regions.  As of 2000, the 
percentage was 13% (ibid). 
 
Faced with ethnic competition for control of state resources concentrated at the 
centre, constitutional architects have asked repeatedly whether there is some 
institutional design that diminishes the ‘immense premium on political power’ 
(Diamond, 1988). Again, Diamond wrote soon after the 1999 transition, ‘Nigeria 
still confronts the basic questions of governance that have dogged it throughout its 
forty years of independence’ including, firstly, ‘How should federal institutions be 
designed to manage and contain the country’s countless ethnic, subethnic, 
regional, and now increasingly religious cleavages?’ (Diamond, 2001: xiii).  The 
standard responses to institutional design covers four main areas: 
 
1. The establishment of new states: At independence, Nigeria comprised three 
regions, each dominated by one of the three big ethnic or national groups 
that together constituted two-thirds of the population.  A fourth region was 
created in 1963.  These were broken up into twelve states in 1968 in the 
belief that smaller states would mitigate the tripolar conflict of the 1960s.  In 
1976, these were further reorganised into nineteen states, then twenty-one in 
1987, thirty in 1991 and thirty-six in 1996.  Division into about nineteen 
states (as under the Second Republic) seemed to ‘work’ well in terms of 
placating key groups (Diamond, 1988), but for minorities, the formation of a 
new state remains attractive in order to secure direct access to federal 
politics.  All except the 1963 reform were created through military fiat 
(Suberu, 2001).  To what extent is the proliferation of states required to 
manage long-standing ethnic diversity and intolerance and to what extent is 






2. Regulation of political parties: military and civilian governments have 
repeatedly specified conditions that parties have had to satisfy in order to 
register for participation in elections.  In 1979, parties were required to have 
executives or governing councils that included members from two-thirds of the 
states.  In 1993, the military went so far as to establish a centre-left and a 
centre-right party, supposedly intending that ideological differences should 
replace cultural ones.  The Constitution for the Fourth Republic requires that 
parties demonstrate national support, and the leadership must reflect the 
‘federal character’ of Nigeria.  President Obasanjo tried, and failed, to secure 
legislation further restricting party registration.  Such rules, whatever the 
intention, serve to protect existing elites and to concentrate power at the centre. 
 
3. The ‘federal character principle’: the 1979 constitution of the Second Republic 
prescribed this principle for presidential appointments, and this provision was 
repeated in the 1999 constitution for the Fourth Republic.  Positions – 
including ambassadors, ministers, senior military officers, and so on – should 
be allocated to people from each state.  It has even been proposed that Nigeria 
have a rotating presidency (see Suberu, 2001) 
 
4. Requirements for election to executive office: under the 1979 and 1999 
constitutions, presidents and governors must receive at least one quarter of the 
vote in at least two-thirds of the states or districts, i.e. they must demonstrate 
broad as well as strong support. 
 
The danger is that these responses perpetuate and even strengthen regional or 
ethnic or religious identities, rather than contain them.  Political parties in the 
Second and Fourth Republics reflected the rules governing their operation.  Rather 
than coalesce around programmes, politicians came together in ‘very large, but 
often structurally and ideologically incoherent, multi-ethnic parties’ (Suberu, 
2001: 117).  In Nigeria, as in Brazil, politicians build support bases through 
patronage, recruiting local patrons into coalitions that lack any clear programmatic 
or ideological basis.  Of course, culture shapes the choice of coalition partners, but 
it does not determine it.  The political importance of cultural diversity in Nigeria 
is, to some extent at least, conditional on the political economy of public finances 
in an oil state and on institutional design.  It is also unclear how and why ethnicity, 
regionalism and religious affiliation sometimes cut across each other, refuting the 
crude simplicity of most ethnic analysis.  In the 1993 presidential election 
(annulled by the military regime), the candidate of the centre-left party (M.Abiola) 
was a Muslim, Yoruba businessman from the West, but he won support from 
Christians as well as from some Muslims in the north.  In the 1999 election, ex-





won most of his votes in the Muslim north. 
 
The rules for sharing federal revenues clearly provide incentives for regionalist 
politics.  Suberu (2001) recommends a further decentralisation of funds through 
revision of the vertical division of revenues, together with a revised horizontal 
division with increased rewards for local revenue generation.  In general, 
however, federalism is an efficient way of allocating public resources to the poor, 





The comparison of Brazil and South Africa leads to some counter-intuitive 
findings.  In two countries with not dissimilar social and economic structures, 
there are completely contrasting rates of redistribution.  In pre-democratic South 
Africa, where supposed cultural diversity became the organising principle of 
political rights, social rights became more universal than in Brazil at the same 
time.  The institutional design of contemporary, democratic Brazil is the product 
of the country’s conservative transition to democracy, and pressures for 
redistribution and social citizenship are largely frustrated by a multiplicity of veto 
points, the constitutional protection of vested interests, and voting patterns among 
the poor that appear to be consequential to rather than prefigurative of institutional 
design.  In South Africa, in contrast, a pacted transition to democracy did not 
entail formal restrictions on redistribution.  The government’s uneven progress in 
policy reform is not because there are too many veto points – in practice, there are 
hardly any – but because the citizenry is not pressing hard for reform, itself due to 
the combination of highly visible, already redistributive social policies and opaque 
labour market and growth path policies.   
 
Nigeria is a case where cultural diversity is extremely evident, and provides an 
obvious explanation for citizens’ failure to organise along class lines and secure a 
more accountable use of government resources.  But it is unclear even here how 
cultural diversity in fact interacts with the character of public finance and 
institutional design.  In practice, Nigerian politics is very similar to Brazilian 
politics, raising the possibility at least that Nigerian politics is shaped more by 
institutional factors (as in Brazil) than it is by cultural diversity (which Brazil does 
not share). 
 
Figure 2 attempts to summarise key aspects of these three actual cases in the 
framework used for ideal types in Figure 1.  South Africa is (or at least was) a 





cleavage (race) largely coincided with class, with the result that racial tensions 
and economic inequality fed on each other and fuelled demands for inter-class as 
well as inter-racial inequality.  White taxpayers conceded redistribution through 
the budget because of – not despite – the racial factor.  In Brazil, in contrast, 
institutional design encouraged regionalist identities that cut across class, 
providing incentives for regionalist political behaviour and inhibiting the 
prospects for redistribution to the poor.  In Nigeria, institutional design 
exacerbated pre-existing cultural diversity that cut across class, with the outcome 
that there was even less demand for redistribution to the poor than in Brazil.    
 
 
Figure 2: Some actual types of solidarity and redistribution 
 

























These conclusions must be tentative, not least because extant evidence and 
analysis is so uneven.  The literatures on politics in South Africa, Brazil and 
Nigeria lags behind political developments by several years, such that we lack 
careful, critical studies (in English) of Brazil under Cardoso or Nigeria under its 
Fourth Republic (i.e. since 1999), and even of South Africa since 1997.  It remains 
unclear what difference democracy has really made in Nigeria, what difference a 
more committed social democratic president made in Brazil, and how a social 
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democratic compromise has developed in South Africa.  We lack analysis of key 
issues even for the preceding periods.  This is most obviously the case for Nigeria, 
where the scale and use of public finance remains largely hidden from view.  For 
all three countries, we lack good data on key aspects of public opinion.  We know 
a lot about attitudes toward democracy and a range of social issues (including in 
Nigeria, from reports on an unreleased Afribarometer study – see Bratton and 
Lewis, 2000 – as well as the publicly available 1995 World Value Survey).  But 
opinion polls tell us little about the detail of solidarity and prejudice.  Surveys 
rarely even probe negative stereotypes of other people or ask about the 
government’s perceived responsibilities to other people, whether defined in class 
or cultural terms. 
 
To interrogate solidarity and prejudice more thoroughly we would need to go 
beyond attitude surveys to either qualitative research (including focus groups) or 
experimental research.  The work on attitudes toward race in North America, by 
scholars such as Paul Sniderman, is instructive here.  Sniderman has used 
experiments to explore attitudes to race through arguments over government 
spending, affirmative action, access to housing and so on.  One of his experiments 
concerns the ‘laid-off worker’: 
The laid-off worker experiment begins with an introduction announcing 
that the next questions concerns a person ‘laid off because the company 
where he or she worked had to reduce its staff’.  The interviewer then 
asks respondents to ‘think for a moment about the person and then tell 
me how much government help, if any, that person should receive while 
looking for a new job,’ and then describes the laid-off worker.  
Specifically, the interviewer says: 
The first person is a [white or black] [male or female], in [his or her] 
[early twenties, mid-thirties or early forties].  He/she is [single, a single 
parent, married, married and has children] and [is a dependable 
worker or is not a very dependable worker]. (Sniderman and Piazza, 
1993: 70) 
 
The description of the laid-off worker is varied between interviews, so that the 
benefits recommended can be linked to each of the different characteristics of the 
worker as well as other data about the respondent and his or her attitudes.  The 
respondent is not in a position to know what it is that is being assessed through the 
vignette.  Another experiment examines whether white Americans dislike 
affirmative action because they are prejudiced against black Americans or whether 
their prejudice is a consequence of their belief that affirmative action in unfair.  
Sniderman and Piazza also examined whether people can be talked out of their 





solidarity are complex phenomena, not easily understood through structured 
questionnaires or one-dimensional analyses.  Sniderman and Piazza (1993) write 
about the ‘varieties of racial politics’.  (Sniderman has used similar computer-
based techniques in probing Canadians’ views on group-based claims – see 
Sniderman et al., 1996).  Experimental vignettes as well as counter-arguments (to 
probe openness to persuasion) have been used in research on tolerance in South 
Africa, by Gibson and Gouws (2002), but not yet with respect to what people 
view as just outcomes, and I am unaware of any comparable studies in Nigeria or 
Brazil. 
 
More innovative studies of public opinion would also shed light on two further, 
specific topics.  How opaque are different areas of public policy?  A key element 
in our analysis of South Africa was that social policies are highly visible but 
public policies on employment are too opaque, with the result that discontent with 
unemployment levels does not readily lead to voters punishing the government 
through electoral defection.  How do citizens in Brazil and Nigeria see public 
policy?  More broadly, what really drives their voting decisions? 
 
Even if we were to have richer data on prejudice and solidarity, there remains the 
problem of causation: are attitudes and beliefs the product or the cause of 
particular political arrangements?  At the very least, we need to be sceptical of 
much work on attitudes.  As Barry (1970) pointed out long ago, in criticism of 
Almond and Verba’s classic work on the ‘civic culture’ (1963), attitudes are 
learned, and reflect the perceived workings of the political system.  Successful 
experiences with liberal democracy made (West) Germans more democratic, not 
visa-versa (see Muller and Seligson, 1994).  In Italy and America, argues Putnam 
(1993, 1995), pro-democratic values develop with the accumulation of social 
capital, itself the product of particular settings.   
 
Cultural diversity in ‘divided’ societies led scholars such as Lijphart to 
recommend consociational institutions.  Such recommendations have been 
criticised in the South African context on two related grounds.  First, they 
emasculate political opposition, which is a crucial component of democracy (Jung 
and Shapiro, 1995).  Second, they assume an immutability about cultural 
identities, notwithstanding evidence that the politicisation of such identities entails 
construction and reconstruction (Jung, 2000).  The danger of power-sharing 
institutions is that they entrench the very values that they seek to contain.  (This is 
a criticism of power-sharing, not of the remedy of alternative voting systems 
advocated by Horowitz, 1991). 
 





similarly serve to inhibit, directly or indirectly, progress toward social citizenship.  
Each of South Africa, Brazil and Nigeria has rules governing the division of 
federal revenues, vertically (between levels of government) and horizontally 
(between different governments at each sub-national level).  Allocating funds to 
regions might pacify the elites in those regions, but is no guarantee that the 
resources actually reach the poor.  Without mechanisms to strengthen 
accountability and democracy at sub-national levels, fiscal federalism impedes 
redistribution to the poor, and may even serve to strengthen ethnic and regional 
political alignments and identities, further undermining the prospects of pro-poor 
outcomes.  In short, the institutional arrangements intended to accommodate 
cultural diversity serve to entrench or even strengthen such diversity and weaken 
class-based economic solidarity and redistribution to the poor.  This is, one hopes, 
an unintended consequence. 
 
Finally, the moral economy of taxation and resource allocation is crucial, yet 
poorly understood.  Scholars of the welfare state in the North have begun to pay 
more attention to tax issues.  Democracy can be forged in societies where citizens 
pay no tax (consider the case of classical Athens – see Wood, 1988).  But taxation, 
especially direct personal taxation, generally leads the tax-payers to demand a 
higher level of accountability on the part of governments.  It is no coincidence that 
South Africa has the highest level of income tax and (probably) the lowest level of 
corruption of the three cases considered here.  The relationship between tax, 












Table A1: Support for democracy/ political opinions 
 







Democracy may have problems but it’s 
better than any other form of government 
(V163) 
73 79 87 
A democratic political system is a good 
way of governing the country (V157) 
77 81 93 
Generally speaking, this country is run by 
a few big interests looking out for 
themselves (V166) 
38 74 87 
The entire way our society is organised 
must be radically changed by 
revolutionary action (V124) 
11 18 32 
 
 
Table A2: Perceptions of poverty 
 







Most poor people have very little chance 
of escaping from poverty (V173) 
47 71 74 
The government is doing too little for 
people in poverty (V174) 
57 36* 83 
A larger share of the population is poor 
than ten years ago (V171) 
51 77 81 
People are poor because society treats 
them unfairly (rather than because they 
are lazy and lack will power) (V173) 
53 76 85 
 
* There were very high ‘don’t know’ responses in Brazil for V174; excluding these ‘don’t 






Table A3: Perceptions of inequality, opportunity and change 
  
South Africa Brazil Nigeria  
% mean % mean % mean 
Incomes should be made more equal 37 31 22 
Neutral or don’t know 34 30 21 
V125 
We need larger income differences as 







Private ownership of business and industry 
should be increased 
41 33 34 
Neutral or don’t know 37 40 28 
V126 
Government ownership of business and 







The government should take more 
responsibility to ensure that everyone is 
provided for 
43 33 44 
Neutral or don’t know  31 30 27 
V127 
People should take more responsibility to 







Competition is good.  It stimulates people to 
work hard and develop new ideas 
64 60 70 
Neutral or don’t know  28 27 21 
V128 
Competition is harmful.  It brings out the 







In the long run, hard work usually brings a 
bettter life 
71 21 60 
Neutral or don’t know  21 26 22 
V129 
Hard work doesn’t generally bring success, 







People can only get rich at the expense of 
others 
18 11 36 
Neutral or don’t know  42 33 29 
V130 








One should be cautious about making major 
changes 
35 50 36 
Neutral or don’t know  40 29 25 
V131 
You will never achieve much in life unless 







Ideas that have stood the test of time are 
generally best 
29 31 47 
Neutral or don’t know  44 31 25 
V132 







Note: For each question, the first row combines scores of 1-3, the second scores of 4-7 together with don’t knows, 
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